Abstract
Abstract Many philosophers working in metaethics ( see Metaethics) have argued that an action's moral properties and its nonmoral or descriptive properties are related in a special way: there can be no difference between two actions' moral properties without some difference in their descriptive properties. Or, to put it a little more formally, if an action (or an agent) a with descriptive properties D 1 … D n has some moral property M, then any action b that has all and only(!) the descriptive properties D 1 … D n is going to have the moral property M as well. This co‐variance relation between the moral property M and the descriptive properties D 1 … D n is called supervenience . The property M is said to supervene on the properties D 1 … D n .
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