SUPERSTRUCTURE OF AUSTRALIAN CAPITALIST SOCIETY AND GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Abstract

The overall research objective of this paper is to critically examine the superstructure of capitalist society. The research question asks about genocide in Australia. Argument will seek to sustain the view that genocide in Australia is a legal contradiction in the superstructure. The chapter’s research methodology critically examines Marxian analytic commentary on the capitalist superstructure. The research is doctrinal, deploying the best available evidence, and developing new knowledge by the generation of syntheses, and in conclusion, by the development of extended syntheses. Recognized rules which appeared in different superstructures might be detected, not only in the realm of law, but also in other superstructural phenomena, for instance the moral rules. Contemporary imperialist international law has transformed into the superstructural phenomena of international arbitrariness and lawlessness. The condition of independence does not in fact exist during the period of imperialism. Sovereignty has thus become a superstructural phenomenon of a merely banal slogan of self-determination, typified by imperialist genocide. Pure thinking that exposed active concealment of the superstructure’s contradictions would appear and be interpreted as active opposition to the ruling elites. These contradictions constituted false consciousness of sentiments, illusions, modes of thought, and views of life, with the minds of the dominant social class transforming them into eternal laws of nature and of reason. The superstructure excluded free ritual in conjunction with ancient custom, therefore also excluding science from the elites’ superstructure, thereby negating indigenous social systems. Contradictions within the culture were intentionally developed by ideologists in the ruling class, because any false consciousness would work to the commercial advantage of the ruling class, and be apparent as ideological and banal clichés. Benhabib reasoned that the so-called ‘banality of evil’, for example, can also be seen as the ‘routinization of evil’, or its everydayness.