Abstract

There are plenty of classic paradoxes about conditional obligations, like the duty to be gentle if one is to murder, and about “supererogatory” deeds beyond the call of duty. But little has been said about the intersection of these topics. We develop the first general account of conditional supererogation, with the power to solve familiar puzzles as well as several that we introduce. Our account, moreover, flows from two familiar ideas: that conditionals restrict quantification and that supererogation emerges from a clash between justifying and requiring reasons.

Highlights

  • The point of morality—if it has one—is to guide our actions

  • We argue that every existing principle struggles with at least some of the hard cases: either consistent-with-duty conditional obligation (Sect. 2), consistent-withduty conditional supererogation (Sect. 3), or contrary-to-duty conditional supererogation

  • Our principle combines a familiar conception of conditionals with a key resource from the theory of supererogation—namely, the idea that permissibility depends on the balance of ‘‘requiring reasons’’ and ‘‘justifying reasons’’ (Sect. 5)

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Summary

Introduction

Moral guidance usually comes in the form of obligations, which steer us away from wrongs like theft and murder. For their sake, morality issues conditional obligations. For example: if you are going to murder, you must do it gently. What makes this obligation ‘‘conditional’’ is that it applies given a certain condition—your murdering. What makes it ‘‘contrary-to-duty’’ is that the condition. Contemporary work on conditional obligations has been in fruitful dialogue with the flourishing study of conditionals (see e.g., Smith, 1993; Bonevac, 1998; McNamara, 2010).. We argue that every existing principle struggles with at least some of the hard cases: either consistent-with-duty conditional obligation Our principle combines a familiar conception of conditionals (as restrictors on quantification) with a key resource from the theory of supererogation—namely, the idea that permissibility depends on the balance of ‘‘requiring reasons’’ and ‘‘justifying reasons’’ (Sect. 5)

From obligation to conditional obligation
Is ‘‘next best’’ good enough?
A solution: justifying and requiring
Conclusion
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