Sunagomen eukotôs hoti ephekhomen: The Rational Ability to Suspend Judgment

Abstract

AbstractThe task of this chapter is to explain how the skeptical ability is not only a causal ability, but also a rational one. Though many scholars hold that it leads only causally, not rationally, to suspension of judgment, I claim that the skeptical ability is guided by the skeptical main principle, which ultimately depends on the idea of a skeptical logos. I try to show this point in the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, in the Mode of Disagreement (and other Agrippan Modes), and also in philosophical investigation in which Sextus argues on both sides of an opposition. Accordingly, there are three rational ways to arrive at suspension: via an argument, in the absence of an argument to justify a dogmatic assertion, and when there is no further argument to incline one towards one side. I also argue that the arguments used by the Pyrrhonist are not only dialectical, but some of them are put forward in his own voice. Some think that, in order to understand the rationality of the skeptical arguments, one needs to postulate ‘principles’ or ‘epistemic norms,’ but it is enough to accept reasonings employed in everyday life. Sextus provides a skeptical explanation of philosophical arguments, which are based on the so-called commemorative signs. Ultimately, philosophical arguments are experienced as persuasive and are reminders of what can be said on both sides of an opposition, thereby exposing our reason as rhetorical, not as demonstrative.KeywordsRationalityPhilosophical argumentsCommemorative signsEveryday reasoningDialectical interpretationEmpirical argumentsDisagreement