Abstract
The idea of procedural justice seems to be one of the most appealing in contemporary political philosophy. This article examines two possible interpretations of that appealing idea. In the first part, I discuss the Rawlsian account of pure procedural justice and argue that Rawls's view is based on substantial assumptions. These assumptions consist in the sens of justice and in individual beliefs about justice underlying the theory of justice as fairness. In the second part, I consider an alternative account of procedural justice, based on social practices and collective processes instead of individual beliefs, as suggested by Stuart Hampshire; In conclusion I argue that the interpretation of procedural justice centered on social practices is the most plausible and philosophically fruitful one.
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