Suffering, agency, and the Bayesian mind.

Abstract

Abstract This chapter evaluates existing literature in animal welfare science and suggests that the term suffering can be used in three ways: as an embellishment when we describe negative affect in animals, to imply conscious experience of negative affect, and to identify negative affect that is severe or prolonged. In contrast, based on literature reviews on human suffering, patients most commonly characterize their condition as suffering when negative affective states are combined or interact when this undermines a person's sense of self, and when this is associated with low mood. Thus the author encourages agencies to be considered as an important component of animal welfare. The concept of agency extends from simply the ability to avoid noxious stimuli, to learn about the environment, to plan and take actions, and to reflect about individual beliefs in a way that contributes to a sense of self. Today's understanding of how animals experience pain has been transformed by Bayesian conceptions of animal cognition. The key element is that perceptions are driven not simply by current afferent inputs, but also by the animal's expectations that direct attention and change the way that bottom-up inputs are evaluated. Taken together, a consideration of animal agency and Bayesian pain processing provide a novel basis for understanding animal suffering. Specifically, painful experiences in combination with low agency conditions and conditions which interfere with Bayesian processing are more likely to result in suffering. Lastly, the author proposed a number of scientific approaches to assessing suffering in animals. In combination with evidence of pain, these include low mood, reduced cognitive functioning, and perhaps threats to the animal's sense of self.