Abstract

Sudan experienced a highly radical Islamic revolution in 1885 and a moderately radical Islamic revolution in 1989. Each time, Ethiopia intervened in a war that Sudan was fighting: in 1885 Mahdist Sudan was fighting a war of national liberation against Egypt, and in the 1990s Sudan was in the midst of a civil war. Egypt also intervened in Sudan's affairs during the 1990s, but not in Sudan's civil war. To explain connections between Sudan's Islamic revolutions and the varying interventions of Ethiopia and Egypt, this article explores the uses and limits of Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory ‐ a theory used by him to highlight causal connections between revolution and interstate security competition. One finding is that the theory provides important and unique insights into relations between revolutionary Sudan and two of its neighbors. The research also constitutes a new test of the theory. Another major finding, therefore, is that most but not alt of the hypotheses deduced from the theory are corroborated. As expected, significant instances of security competition were caused or exacerbated by Sudan's Islamic revolutions. However, the two revolutions did not cause security competition to increase nearly as much as the theory predicts. Implications of these findings are then explored.

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