Sudan's Humanitarian Disaster

Abstract

As a country deeply divided along ethnic and religious lines the Sudan had already experienced large-scale violence before its independence. The Torit mutiny of 1955, the accompanying massacres in Equatoria province, and the government's brutal reprisals set the stage for what was to follow. Hostilities between northerners and southerners quickly escalated into a full-scale civil war that has lasted almost four decades. The unfulfilled promises of the Addis Ababa agreement (1972) only served to exacerbate the violence when it erupted again in 1983. Since then, civil war and the related famines and diseases have consumed one million lives, displaced more than four million people, and denuded the war zone of all health, educational, and other social services. With the extension of the war to the north, first to the Nuba Mountains, then to the southern Blue Nile, the eastern region, and finally to Darfur, Sudan has become a humanitarian disaster of epic proportions.1What involvement Canada had in the Sudan until 1998 was largely inspired by humanitarian concerns.2 Trade between the two countries was and still is virtually nonexistent, and the Canadian private sector had shown little or no interest in Sudan. As a non-core country in aid program, Sudan received hardly any assistance from CIDA in the 19703. Beginning in 1982-83 aid to Sudan jumped to more than $20 million and stayed at or near that level for almost a decade. Since 1992, when Canada suspended government-to-government bilateral aid to Sudan in response to its human rights record, and throughout most of the 19905, CIDA continued to contribute humanitarian relief, though at a reduced level of roughly $10 million annually. This aid was mainly in the form of food aid, medical supplies, seeds, and tools, and was channelled through United Nations agencies and NGOs operating under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan as well as through the International Committee of the Red Cross.It was thus in response to the prolonged drought of the 19803, the reemerging civil war after 1983, and the escalation of human rights abuses after the National Islamic Front seized power in 1989 that Canada slowly became more involved in Sudan's affairs, extending humanitarian assistance, expressing our opposition to human rights violations by Khartoum through the United Nations, and encouraging and supporting the peace process launched by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in 1993-94. As Lloyd Axworthy, then foreign minister, said in 1999, Canada's commitment to human security, particularly the protection of civilians in armed conflict, provides the basis for its involvement in Sudan.' With so few interests there, Canada had no reason to establish a diplomatic mission in Khartoum, at least not until 2000. Any consular or diplomatic concerns were handled from Cairo until 1986 and, since then, from Addis Ababa.Talisman's announcement in August 1998 of its friendly takeover of Arakis Energy's 25 percent interest in the Sudan's Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) changed all that. Within a year Talisman's operation in the Sudan had become a public relations disaster, both for the company and for the government of Canada. Notwithstanding the repeated denials of its officials, Talisman did contribute to the massive displacement of people on and around the drilling site and undermine the peace process. As for the Canadian government, failure to speak out against Talisman, let alone take any action against it, began to erode Ottawa's credibility and raise questions about its commitment to human security. Opposition members of parliament, Canadian churches, and NGOs with an African involvement, as well as a small band of knowledgeable journalists and academics began to ask how Axworthy could talk about protecting the rights of Sudanese citizens and working towards a peaceful settlement of the civil war when a Canadian company was seen to contribute to the abnegation of those very same ends. …