Abstract

PurposeThe equal representation of employees on codetermined supervisory boards is one of the distinctive features of the German corporate governance system. This study aims to examine the relevance of the frequent assumption according to which this system is rooted in a typically “German culture”.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies Davis and Thompson’s (1994) mobilization theory as an interpretive grid to historical sources to reveal the determinants of the institutionalization of equal board representation in post-war Germany.FindingsThe present contribution reveals that the supposedly “German tradition” of board representation is a myth. The specific regime of codetermined supervisory boards is instead the outcome of the dramatic political and institutional circumstances of the late 1940s, which saw fierce struggles and the mobilization of various actors ranging from politicians and industrialists to trade unionists.Originality/valueThe German Catholic Church is shown to have played a significant, albeit seldom recognized, role in this search for institutional consensus. It acted as a broad-based “supporting institution”, positively influencing mobilization efforts in favor of board codetermination and ultimately enabling an agreement to be reached.

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