Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of distinct institutional rules on choices of electoral strategies made by legislators in the 1998 Brazilian elections. Two types of constraints were assessed. The first set refers to pressures created by the Brazilian open-list proportional representation electoral system that tends to personalize the vote. The second emerges from the centralizing effect of the internal rules of the Chamber of Deputies, which shift bargaining power from the individualized incumbent to party leaders and to the President, basically due to their control of the Chamber’s agenda and discretion over the allocation of public funds. We find that both institutional settings influence the outcomes of elections, but that constituency interests appear to be a stronger constraint to legislator’s choice of electoral strategies.
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