Abstract
Our study analyzes financial reporting data on earnings management from a rapidly changing economy—the PRC. Some Chinese regulatory reforms allow for an easy identification of incentives to engage in both accounting and real earnings management activities. In addition, straightforward economic reasoning suggests that firms incur different costs for pursuing these strategies, which leads to the possibility of a hierarchy or ranking of different earnings management practices. Our results show that accounting and real earnings management activities were significantly higher for firms in danger of missing a regulation imposed performance threshold. After controlling for the availability of the different instruments, our results provide weak evidence for a ranking of different earnings management activities.
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