Substantive Positivism and the Idea of Crime

Abstract

Efforts to construct theories of crime consistent with a priori principles typically prove unsatisfactory. Awareness of this fact led the early positivists to reject choice theories in favor of discipline-specific theories tested by examination of correlations among directly measurable variables. Today, disciplinary theories of crime rely more on a priori principles than those theories they were designed to replace. This article critiques these principles and contrasts them with principles derived from a substantive theory of crime based on the idea of restraint. The contrast between positivistic and restraint theories is illustrated by comparing their positions on the following issues: (1) whether to begin with the presuppositions of one or another of the established disciplines; (2) whether to assume that the causes of a phenomenon require that it occur; (3) whether to assume that the characteristics of acts or events are relevant to or implicated in their causation; (4) whether behaviorally different acts and events may be homogeneous with respect to causation; and (5) whether causes or explanations common to all acts or events must enter the explanation of particular acts or events. These questions are examined in light of their consequences for criminological theory and research. In all cases, restraint or choice theory is more likely to produce conclusions consistent with the evidence.