Substantive Equality Revisited

Abstract

The right to equality remains a central commitment in human rights law. Yet the meaning of equality remains deeply contested both in theory and in international and domestic human rights law. This paper argues that the right to equality should not be seen in abstract formulaic terms, but should be responsive to those who are disadvantaged, excluded, ignored or demeaned. Drawing on the strengths and weakness of familiar conceptions, it suggests that substantive equality should be developed in a multi-dimensional format, which recognises and addresses the distributional, recognition, structural and exclusive wrongs experienced by out-groups. This yields four main purposes or dimensions of substantive equality: to redress disadvantage; to address stigma; stereotyping; prejudice and violence; to embrace difference and achieve structural change; and to enhance voice and participation. These four dimensions create a dynamic conception of the right to equality, building on existing understandings but also inviting further development and evolution.