Abstract
Shore-side electricity has been put forward to ease the pollution problem of ports. This paper considers a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, one port company, and the other port company, and establishes the payoff matrix of the three parties. Through analyzing the replicated dynamic equations, we find that only when the government selects the passive supervision and both port companies implement SSE can make the environmental benefit reach the maximum. Meanwhile, the larger port company is more forward-looking, which speeds up the evolution to be equilibrium.
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