Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution

Abstract

This paper examined the proposals in the Draft European Constitution that were designed to protect subsidiarity. Whilst the Draft Constitution failed to be ratified, the procedures discussed in this paper were incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. The paper examines the limitations on the pre-Lisbon methods of protecting subsidiarity - in particular, the unwillingness of European institutions to make use of the principle - and argues that the move in the Draft Constitution towards empowering National Parliaments to police subsidiarity was a step in the right direction, as these are the institutions with most to gain from the successful operation of the principle. However, the limitations on the role of National Parliaments in this area - the requirement that a 'reasoned opinion' be given, for instance - limits its effectiveness. It is also suggested that National Parliaments could be given a bigger role in the process, and accorded a general power to veto European legislation, subject to some conditions.