Subsidiarity and the Criminal Jury

Abstract

Abstract The institution of trial-by-jury is a puzzle in the modern criminal justice system. It has dubious merits as a mechanism for applying facts to law. If anything, it represents a challenge to the very idea that decision-making should be consistent and transparent. Yet the emphasis on the relative ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the jury as a trier of fact may miss the point. The jury does not function merely as a verdict-generating machine, or as a procedural safeguard for individual defendants. It ensures that the local community, with its customs, norms, and ways of life, is not simply trampled upon by a remote federal legislature. The legitimizing significance of the jury, in other words, arguably lies in its role as a kind of law-finder. With this in mind, we may do better to view it, not principally as a liberal institution, but as a manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity.