Subordinating Intelligence

Abstract

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere during counterterrorism operations. Although the global war on terrorism provided a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late 1980s and 1990s that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned, policy makers made military support the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response, the CIA and DoD instituted changes that altered their relationship. While congressional debates over the Intelligence Community’s future were occurring, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship during operations. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening long-term analysis. Despite concerns, no major changes to intelligence organization or priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers fixated on terrorism. The DoD/CIA operational relationship has led to successes, but the CIA’s counterterrorism and military support requirements place a significant burden on the organization. As the sole independent US intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate intelligence collection from the institutions that develop and execute policy. Its increased focus on support to military operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD. The CIA and DoD are the ones affected by this evolving relationship, but policy makers’ preference for military force and the militarization of foreign policy has led both organizations down this path.