Abstract

Due to different factors, federations exhibit significant variation in their respective forms, natures and degrees of decentralization. Regardless of these differences, however, the necessity of a federal covenant, which bestows genuine autonomy on subnational governments, is not contested. Indisputably, a mere constitutional stipulation does not guarantee the financial autonomy of sub-national governments as the latter is influenced by the political economy narratives of a government. Though the fallings of Ethiopian “developmentalism” on the effective functioning of the federal system are multifaceted, this article scrutinizes its impact on the fiscal (tax) autonomy of subnational governments. Looking at the contemporary “developmental-oriented” measures of the federal government vis-a-vis the constitutionally dictated autonomy of regions to generate own-source revenue, the article argues that the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments is highly constrained due to the adoption of the developmental state paradigm.

Highlights

  • In spite of the ever growing debate on the economic rationale for decentralization, the issue of fiscal federalism has become more of a political issue of self determination than a matter of public welfare (Prud’homme & Shah, How to cite this paper: Yesigat, Z. (2016)

  • Many agree that federalism was rather the best, perhaps the only measure of the time that was taken for the survival of the country with the view of balancing the forces of unity and diversity (Assefa, 2007; Fasil, 1997)

  • Some scholars argue that the Developmental State (DS) of Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon introduced in the aftermath of the 2005 popular election (Messay, 2011)

Read more

Summary

Introduction

In spite of the ever growing debate on the economic rationale for decentralization, the issue of fiscal federalism has become more of a political issue of self determination than a matter of public welfare (Prud’homme & Shah, How to cite this paper: Yesigat, Z. (2016). In light of the ideology-structural nexus, a developmental state can be discerned as, “[a] state that puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal” (Bagchi, 2000). Some scholars argue that the Developmental State (DS) of Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon introduced in the aftermath of the 2005 popular election (Messay, 2011). Contrary to this scholarly argument, documents prepared by the government and/or the ruling party invoke the paradigm was one of the reasons for the TPLF split in 2001 (Meles, 2006). The objective of this study is, to scrutinize the nexus of the impact of the developmental state paradigm on the taxation powers and the volumes own-source revenues of regions, together with the trend toward vertical imbalance in the federation

Fiscal Federalism
Subnational Fiscal Autonomy-Redefined
The Developmental State Vis-à-Vis Fiscal Autonomy of Regions in Ethiopia
Big-Sized Government and Revenue Recentralization in Ethiopia
Trends of Vertical Imbalance in the DS of Ethiopia
Conclusion
Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.