Abstract
It is well known that nationally democratic states sometimes harbor pockets of subnational authoritarianism. However, political scientists have yet to address whether and under what circumstances authoritarian states harbor democratic political subunits. In this paper, I put forward a novel concept to capture this phenomenon: subnational democracy. After reviewing existing scholarship on subnational regimes, I discuss the constitutive features of subnational democracy with reference to authoritarian Mexico and Serbia: two cases in which opposition subnational governments institutionalized core features of democracy on the local level. I then put forward a theory to explain the conditions under which subnational democracy is likely to emerge. Where opposition leaders coordinate subnational protests and international support to defend their local governments, the likelihood the national regime will resort to repression decreases and subnational democracy is more likely to emerge. Where opposition leaders fail to engineer one or both types of support, authoritarian national regimes display no such tolerance. I substantiate my theory with evidence from Mexico and Serbia, as well as several negative cases.
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