Subjectivity and Embodiment

Abstract

The contemporary debate about a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness first requires a sound definition of what it means to be subjectively aware of embodied existence. This chapter first explains how a theory of intentional mental acts, inspired by Husserlian phenomenology, leads to an interpretation of phenomenal consciousness as a non-intentional and non-representational property of mental events. This conception sustains a distinction of the phenomenal quality of consciousness from qualia. The chapter then clarifies phenomenal consciousness or the distinctive subjective character of conscious mental processes as pre-reflective self-awareness. In the last part, a phenomenology of the lived body elucidates the phenomenal properties of the lived body, and specifies pre-reflective self-awareness as a specific bodily self-awareness. On the basis of this phenomenological framework, the author asks what an explanation of conscious embodiment should try to achieve. Keywords:distinctive subjective character; embodiment; Husserlian phenomenology; phenomenal consciousness