Subjective truth: A critique

Abstract

This paper will examine the concept of subjective truth, indicating what it can and can not sensibly mean. Although the paper is centrally concerned with this concept, it also will serve to establish a point of textual interpretation. Many critics of Kierkegaard have claimed he maintains a subjectivist position on truth claims, that somehow what is true or false is simply a matter of individual decision. H. J. Paton, for example, in The Modern Predicament interprets Kierkegaard in this way. 1 This interpretation is mistaken and we can see why it is mistaken if we compare what Kierkegaard says about truth and subjectivity with some interpretations of what subjective truth might mean. The concept of subjective truth has no established use and, thus, a discussion of it is an exploration of possibility rather than fact. Or more accurately, it is implied by attitudes which are very extensively found but that implication has not been systematically formulated by the owners of those attitudes. These attitudes collectively express the position of subjectivism and subjective truth is the view on truth implied by, although not confined to, that position. The importance of the concept of subjective truth lies as much in its intertwining in these attitudes as it does in its status as a theoretical possibility. Simply as a concept it seemingly could be at home in any area where truth is a relevant issue since it suggests a possibility of how truth could be found in any area where truth can be found. But it is more pressing as a problem related to actual beliefs and attitudes. Subjectivism is a position which has never lacked for adherents and it surely is not currently in a fallow period either. But seemingly few philosophers have been among these advocates; it is a view of the layman and not the professional. This situation complicates a discussion of the related concept of subjective truth. Since the concept's adherents have lacked the analytic and argumentative tools needed for its philosophical formulation, one who would discuss it philosophically is required to be, in a sense, both advocate and critic. He must both define the problem, formulate the position, explore its meanings, and then present the criticisms of his own work. This paper is such an attempt. Because the concept is found inchoate, I have given considerable space simply to the ordering of the various possible meanings of the concept. And to put order into the exploration I have adopted a division of the paper into four sections. First, I shall