Abstract
Based on the evolutionary game mode, this study constructs the evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration considering the reward-punishment mechanism of the government. The subject behavior of core enterprises and noncore enterprises in the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration is investigated from a microperspective. The results suggest that the key factors influencing the enthusiasm of enterprises to participate in collaborative innovation are the level of technology spillover, technology absorption capacity, the share of excess benefits, the reward for active participation in collaborative innovation, and the punishment for passive participation. The game evolution result of the two parties will converge to (actively participate in collaborative innovation, actively participate in collaborative innovation) when the government rewards obtained by the party actively participating in collaborative innovation exceed the technology spillover loss and the excess benefits exceed the difference between the acquired technology spillover and the penalty for passive participation. These findings may provide a decision-making reference for the government to formulate the strategy of collaborative innovation in civil-military integration.
Highlights
Collaborative innovation in civil-military integration is the development of independent innovation, which promotes the effective utilization of research and development factors through the rational allocation of resources
If M > TA, M > TB, TA − N > μApPAB, and TB − N > μBpPAB, among the four equilibrium points, only (0, 1) and (1, 0) are progressively stable. is result indicates that in the long-term evolutionary game between core and noncore enterprises, only one party will choose the strategy of active participation in collaborative innovation, while the other party will choose the strategy of passive participation in collaborative innovation to obtain extra benefits from technology spillovers
The government will give necessary incentives to enterprises that actively participate in collaborative innovation, the technology spillover obtained by choosing the strategy of passive participation in collaborative innovation is greater than the profit sharing obtained by choosing the strategy of active participation in collaborative innovation for both parties
Summary
Collaborative innovation in civil-military integration is the development of independent innovation, which promotes the effective utilization of research and development factors through the rational allocation of resources. Most of the existing studies have discussed the theoretical framework, existing problems, and development paths of the civil-military integration collaborative innovation from the perspective of theoretical analysis, but there are insufficient investigations on the operational mechanism and the evolution of subject behavior of civilmilitary integration collaborative innovation. This study systematically analyzes the realization mechanism of collaborative innovation in civilmilitary integration under the mechanism of reward and punishment, which may provide guidance for civil-military enterprises to carry out technological innovation cooperation. Taking into account the bounded rationality of the innovation subject, this study uses the evolutionary game model to investigate the subject behavior of the civilmilitary integration collaborative innovation and analyzes the external factors affecting the evolution of the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration. In the collaborative innovation of civil-military integration, enterprises with more resources
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