Abstract

For an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S and compact metric action sets A1, A2,…, An, sufficient conditions are given for the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria. One result is that such equilibria exist if the law of motion q(⋯∣ s, a) is, for fixed s, continuous in a = (a1,a2,…,an) for the total variation norm and the payoff functions f1, f2,…,fn are bounded, Borel measurable functions of the sequence of states (s1, s2,…) ∈ Sℕ and, in addition, are continuous when Sℕ is given the product of discrete topologies on S.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.