Abstract
The judicial process is modeled as a biform contest with riskaverse contestants. I provide a sufficient condition for a nonempty core and show that the effect of the severity of the charges on the core is ambiguous. I also show that the practice of plea bargaining actually applies Moulin's (1984) mechanism which non-cooperatively implements the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) bargain solution in subgame perfect equilibrium. The charge reduction rate is inversely related to the defendant's and positively related to the prosecutor's fear of ruin index, but increases with the defendant's stake, implying that the defendant's gain (and social cost) from the guilty plea deal increases with the severity of the crime.
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