Abstract
We show that subgame-perfect equilibria of infinite-horizon games arise as limits, as the horizon grows long and epsilon small, of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibria of games which are truncated after a finite horizon. A number of applications show that this result provides a useful technique for analyzing the existence and uniqueness of infinite-horizon equilibria. We extend our result to the sequential equilibrium concept.
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