Abstract
AbstractIn Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.
Highlights
1 Introduction In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty argues that a scientific domain of entities cannot be clearly separated from an ontological one: the sciences always incorporate philosophical thinking, and philosophical investigations of ontology typically depart from scientificempirical explorations of the world
Metaphysical inference involves considerable epistemic risk, and philosophers traditionally disagree about the possibilities of reducing that risk: while empiricists put emphasis on the “empirical vulnerability” of the inference, other philosophers rely on what they perceive to be the explanatory power of metaphysical inference
What these case studies suggest is that realists and antirealists might disagree over whether or not a single theory from the history of science qualifies as a positive instance of the type of theories that figure in the premise of pessimistic meta-induction (PMI). Another conclusion to be drawn states that Ladyman and Ross should suspend judgment about the reality of material structures. They say about “the actual world occupied by all observers” that it “is either truly tensed, or else merely seems to us to be so given the measurements we can obtain, but is a block universe”; and they say about their metaphysics that it “should avoid presupposing either side of this disjunction” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 246)
Summary
In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty argues that a scientific domain of entities cannot be clearly separated from an ontological one: the sciences always incorporate philosophical thinking, and philosophical investigations of ontology typically depart from scientificempirical explorations of the world. Of the deflationary stance he says that he mentions it “primarily so as to set it aside” (Chakravartty 2017, 140); and he decides to turn his attention to the “dramatic conflict” between the empiricist and metaphysical stances of which he says that it “lies at the heart of many of the epic, perennial battles of philosophy down through the ages” (Chakravartty 2017, 32). I will suggest that the ability of neo-Kantianism to solve that conflict strictly parallels the ability of the original combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism to solve the Kantian antinomies (Sect. 5)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
