Styles of Reasoning and Relativism

Abstract

AbstractIn the first half of this chapter I shall discuss some preliminary questions in order to arrive at a more complete theory of styles of reasoning. I shall argue that, while in certain cases two or more different styles of reasoning are used together to solve the same scientific problem, in other cases either of two styles of reasoning can be used alternatively. Afterwards, I shall address the question as to whether or not members of a given community can make sense of a style-dependent sentence uttered by a member of a community that adopts a different style of reasoning. My main point will be that there are intelligible sentences which are not ‘projectible’: one cannot use them in one’s own style of reasoning in order to know. In the second part of this chapter, I shall argue that from the styles project emerges the question whether or not Hacking’s ideas imply epistemic relativism. Inter alia, in this chapter and the next I shall show that there cannot exist any universal and atemporal criterion of justification within the framework of Hacking’s characterization of styles of reasoning.KeywordsIan HackingStyles of ReasoningTruth-valueIntelligibilityProjectibilityTrustEpistemic Relativism