Studying Dangers for Corruption in Least-Corrupt Countries

Abstract

We know that corruption also exists in developed democracies that are usually regarded as virtually free of corruption. I argue that corruption research concerning these countries is somewhat limited about a) danger zones for corruption and b) how institutional mechanisms that promote or check corruption in the public sector are affected by internal and external changes, i.e. changes such as restructuring of the public sector, introduction of businesslike management methods and greater possibilities for delegation. Another gap in the research literature is that although there is an understanding that institutional and contextual factors as well as individual choice need to be considered simultaneously, so far this is lacking in the actual studies undertaken. The paper suggests as a way forward, a combined multi-method approach, appropriate both for case studies and comparative studies, applicable to least-corrupt countries. I first develop the analytical concepts of corruption and danger zones. I then turn to macro- and micro-oriented studies to explore contextual-factors respectively the mechanics of corruption. I argue that the principal-agent approach, if used process-oriented and qualitatively, can be applied to study public sector organisations, and why and how chains of delegation become vulnerable to corruption. Finally, I outline how this approach could be applied to study corruption and danger zones in two least corrupt countries, the United Kingdom and Sweden.