Study on the mechanism of green power-carbon market intrinsic coupling and power sector trading strategies

Abstract

The expansion of carbon market will pose new challenges to the construction of national unified large market and electric-carbon coupling. On the basis of explaining the coupling mechanism of green power and carbon market, this paper analyzes the game relationship and trading strategy between multiple trading entities under the background of carbon expansion. By establishing a multi-agent evolutionary game model, this paper explores the probability change of purchasing green electricity certificate (GEC) and carbon emission right (CET) of thermal power, cement and steel enterprises in the coupled market. The results show that the higher the penalty amount, the higher the probability of cement and steel enterprises to increase the purchase of CET, while the probability of thermal power enterprises to purchase GEC is lower. Compared with the potential income of other subjects, the potential income brought by thermal power's participation in the GEC market can improve the probability of thermal power purchasing GEC. If one party in the coupled market increases the price of CETs, at least one party will reduce the amount of CET purchased. In addition, the discussion found that: penalty differentiation is more conducive to fair market competition and development; From the perspective of emission reduction, timely adjustment of the price difference between CET price and GEC price will be more conducive to solving problems such as the contradiction between market supply and demand and the difficulty of coupling market integration. In short, the integration of the electric-carbon market and the degree of perfection of the market mechanism have an important impact on the equilibrium decision of multi-trading entities under the expansion of the carbon market.