Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game

Quanxi Wang,Haodong Wang,Yuan Xiu,Ni Wang

doi:10.3390/su14063374

Abstract

In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaanxi in the Yellow River Basin as an example, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, obtains the external conditions for various stakeholders to achieve stable cooperation from the perspective of the government, and demonstrates the necessity of combining vertical and horizontal ecological compensation. The sensitivity of each party’s decision making to key elements is analyzed through a simulation. The results show that: (1) the optimal strategy is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government; the strong regulatory power of the central government can eliminate the influence of the initial will; (2) development opportunity costs and vertical fiscal transfer payments have the most obvious influence on upstream government decision-making; (3) the effect on optimal decision state of downstream paying upstream ecological compensation is higher than that of upstream paying downstream ecological compensation; (4) the punishment of the central government should ensure the binding force on the lower governments, and the revenue and expenditure under its supervision strategy should ensure the effectiveness of the supervision public power. The above conclusions provide support for improving the ecological compensation mechanism of transboundary basins.

Highlights

With the rapid development of society, the economy, and the rapid growth in population, the damage that human production and life causes to watershed ecosystems is increasing
In previous vertical ecological compensation research, the research conclusions often only explain that relying solely on the financial support of the central government is insufficient to meet the needs of long-term watershed ecological protection and construction; this paper demonstrates this view from the perspective of evolutionary game, and verifies the necessity of the combination of horizontal ecological compensation and vertical ecology
Considering that the punishment measures of the central government and the vertical financial transfer to the upstream government have an impact on the strategies of upstream and downstream governments of the basin, this paper demonstrates the necessity of combining the vertical and horizontal ecological compensation of the basin by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model between the upstream government (Shaanxi Province), the downstream government (Henan Province), and the central government

Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of society, the economy, and the rapid growth in population, the damage that human production and life causes to watershed ecosystems is increasing. In order to ensure the sustainable and coordinated development of the watershed economy and society, watershed ecological governance has become a necessity [1–3]. Watershed ecological governance often involves multiple administrative units [4–6]. The dynamic characteristics of a river system mean that the main upstream and downstream bodies of a river basin involve different interests and unclear rights and responsibilities in terms of the development and utilization of water resources, environmental protection, and ecological governance [7–9]. How to solve or alleviate the problems of ecological externalities has become the key to the ecological governance of river basins [10–12]. In order to reduce or eliminate the problems caused by watershed ecological externality, many scholars around the world have carried out research on it and put forward solutions, among which is ecological (environmental) system services payments [13–15].

Objectives

Methods

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Discussion

Conclusion