Study on evolution of cooperation by an asymmetric population game on complex networks

Abstract

This paper studies on the evolution of cooperation by an asymmetric population game on complex networks. By designing an asymmetric population game on different complex networks and with the help of Matlab simulation, we find that the cooperation evolution of this population game depends on three important factors: cost-to-benefit of SD-type players (r 2 ), the number of PD-type players (n PD ), and the average degrees of complex networks ( ). The simulation results reveal several facts. For small r 2 (r 2 PD , neither regular networks nor BA scale-free networks are in favor of cooperation. And the smaller the average degree is, the less cooperation in the game becomes. However, for large r 2 (r 2 > 0.6) and the given n PD , both regular networks and BA scale-free networks are conducive to cooperation. Further more, the smaller average degree is, the more cooperation becomes.