Abstract
In this work, dual-channel supply chain price models and their optimal strategy were studied under government low-carbon innovative subsidies. The decision-making mechanism and complex dynamical characteristics of manufacturer's wholesale price and retailers’ sales commissions were discussed. The results showed that when the government implements low-carbon subsidy policy, the change of price adjustment coefficient of manufacturer, online and offline retailers will lead to the instability of system, and manufacturer has more influence on the price system than retailers. Consumers’ low-carbon preference is conducive for manufacturer and retailers to increase sales prices, but if consumers over pursue low-carbon products, the price system will also fall into chaos, which will cause fluctuations and losses in profits of supply chain members.
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