Structure of certain North American government fishery agencies and effective resource management

Abstract

Fisheries resource management in many countries has been relatively unsuccessful in sustaining optimal yields; frequently this has been in spite of the availability of good science. Some have suggested that too much emphasis has been placed on physical and biological parameters while other aspects have been neglected. Renewable marine resources are generally common property in most nations, thus under public stewardship. Jurisdiction for resources resides with the Canadian federal government. By contrast, individual American maritime states have jurisdiction to 3 miles. This has tended to cast the American federal fisheries agency in a resource development role. The influence on conservation of the different hierarchical systems employed within Canada and The United States of America (U.S.A. or America) is assessed. Two examples are chosen, the Canadian Irish moss and the California sardine fisheries, to illustrate the influence of fishery agency structure on conservation. The Canadian Atlantic Irish moss (Chondrus crispus) fishery from 1950 to the present was traced. Government-sponsored industrial and resource development preceded stock assessment science and regulations by 10 years. Consequently, resource overexploitation occurred. Resource management activities appeared not to follow a logical sequence because all resource management functions, although within a single government, were not within a single ministry. The state of California passed legislation in the 1880's supporting conservation of renewable marine resources. Fishery assessment science was initiated in 1914. Nevertheless, the California sardine (Sardinops sagax) fishery collapsed in 1947. Rivalry had developed between state, federal, and university fishery scientists. Industry exploited this split to avoid annual catch quotas until 1967, 20 years after the fishery collapsed. It is concluded that the placement of fishery management personnel in two agencies may have indirectly brought about the collapse of the fishery. A hypothesis that the structure of the fishery resource management agency can critically influence conservation of the resource is formulated.