Structuralism’s casus. Article second

Abstract

This article concludes the series of publications on structuralism. In the three previous articles, the hypothesis that structuralism cannot be understood and appreciated outside of what can be called “modern humanism” was first expressed and substantiated. In this article, structuralism, understood in its ontogeny and phylogeny, is related to the horizon of modern epistemology and philosophy of science. Moreover, modern epistemological models must themselves be taken seriously, i. e. methods of modern comparative epistemology. Thus, the map of theories of structuralism is more complicated to see than with a strictly institutional approach. One of the poles of this whole is radically constructivist models (the most complete constructivist model of structuralism today is the concept of N. Poselyagin). The opposite pole is the realistic understanding of structuralism proposed in this series of publications. A number of models reveal fundamental complexity, revealing a realistic background under the layer of constructivist rhetoric. Thus, the theory of structuralism of the greatest epistemologist and methodologist of science P. Serio turns out to be dual. Corrections to the archeology of M. Foucault’s knowledge inevitably lead his theory to the realistic pole.