Structural uncertainty and policy making for a mega public project in communist China: the case of Three Gorges Dam

Abstract

As an alternative to the cost and benefit analysis adopted by scholars in neoclassical economics, this paper utilises an evolutionary approach to understand the policy making of the Three Gorges Dam project. We argue that the decision on constructing the Three Gorges project and its implementation are largely the result of the interactions of different levels of public agents and special interest groups who attempt to pursue their self-interest in the policy making process. This paper focuses on three levels of governmental interaction, namely central leadership, provincial officials and local cadres. Under uncertainty, the construction of the world's largest dam is the result of clashes in private interests, bargaining and consensus building among all levels of governments and special interest groups. The policy making process often produces an unintended consequence in which the players do not know in advance. This paper concludes that the outcome of the Three Gorges Dam today could not be known in advance.