Structural restraints and institutional innovation in local governance: a case study of administrative examination and approval system reforms in Shunde, Ningbo, and Taizhou

Abstract

In the governance system under China’s unitary administration model, local governments not only have to undertake the overall administration responsibility for the regional development and stability, but also have to accept the professional and functional supervision of various departments of the central government. This compartmentalized management system creates an objective structural constraint on the system innovation of local governments. In a governmental administrative system where the two contrasting logical notions of hierarchical authority (known as a ‘kuai’) and administration based on function (known as a ‘tiao’) are combined, the biggest obstacle to the system innovation in local governance is protecting the interests of various internal departments under the ‘dual leadership’. To make a breakthrough in the systematic protectionism of interests, local leaders with keen determination to reform the governance system must take active initiatives, acquire more political resources, and give full play to new creative forces in order to implement corresponding system innovation in local governance.