Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors

Paweł Gładziejewski,Marcin Miłkowski

doi:10.1007/s10539-017-9562-6

Paweł Gładziejewski, Marcin Miłkowski

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-017-9562-6

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Abstract

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two.

Highlights

Antirepresentationalism has been one of the major recent trends in theorizing about the mind
This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations
Using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a ‘‘fuel of success’’, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using system

Summary

Introduction

Antirepresentationalism has been one of the major recent trends in theorizing about the mind. Some modern antirepresentationalists employ a sort of trivializing argumentative strategy. Instead of (or in addition to) developing new theories of cognition that do without the notion of representation, they attempt to show that some of the most prevalent existing notions of mental representation are not suited to do the theoretical jobs that are expected of them. The idea that representations are covariance-based indicators or detectors has been subjected to this sort of trivializing attack. It has been argued that detectors functionally boil. Miłkowski down to mere causal mediators, and are not representations (Ramsey 2007), or that they are not contentful (Hutto and Myin 2013)

Objectives

Conclusion