Structural Remedies in EU Antitrust and Merger Control

Abstract

In both antitrust and merger cases, remedies serve the same purpose, namely to stop the infringement of competition and restore competition. However, the practice of remedy policy in these two areas is varied, for example, structural remedies are preferred in merger cases but strictly limited in antitrust. This article analyses the extremely different positions of structural remedies in antitrust and merger control. It also reviews the facts and remedies of the E.ON Electricity case, the first antitrust decision with structural remedies adopted or imposed by the European Commission. It argues that EU competition law is not a coherent system for while antitrust enforcement is too weak, merger control is too strong. Furthermore, this article argues that the deterrent power of Article 102 should be reinforced to increase its weight in fighting unilateral anticompetitive behaviours, but merger control should show more tolerance to the efficiency-enhanced mergers.