Abstract
Highly technical rules for regional electricity markets shape opportunities for new technologies and the pace of transition to a cleaner and more distributed power system. We compare three case studies of regional transmission organizations and identify common mechanisms that describe the relationship between institutional design and administrative policy decisions. We compare industry actors, old and new, across these case studies to better understand structural power and institutional stability through four mechanisms drawn from the literature: (1) self-reinforcing interests, (2) participation in and position of groups, (3) influence over communication and information, and (4) control over problem framing and pace of decisions. A focus on the mechanisms that operate within RTO governance provides insight into needed RTO governance reform.
Highlights
Ongoing efforts to promote more sustainable, resilient, and equitable energy systems are disrupting economic, political, and institutional relationships (Lockwood et al, 2017; Loorbach et al, 2017)
This paper examines case studies of the mechanisms that link independent system operator and regional transmission operator (RTO) decision-making processes and the market rules for one set of new grid technologies: energy storage resources
We focus on the evolution of storage market rules in three RTO regions: the California Independent System Operator (CAISO), the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), and the Independent System Operator New England (ISO-NE)
Summary
Ongoing efforts to promote more sustainable, resilient, and equitable energy systems are disrupting economic, political, and institutional relationships (Lockwood et al, 2017; Loorbach et al, 2017). Investor-owned utilities (IOUs) built interconnected transmission networks and coordinated operations through what are often referred to as regional power pools These voluntary industry agreements were used to share reserve capacity, exchange excess low-cost electricity, and in some cases, to implement joint dispatch of generation resources. By the late 1990s, the United States had 17 large multi-plant utilities with central dispatch, five power pools, and several other “loose” power pools with less formal coordination (Cramer and Tschirhart, 1983; U.S Energy Information Administration, 1998) This coordination benefited consumers through efficiencies and improved reliability and created barriers for the growing independent generation market (Peskoe, 2021). Of these seven RTOs, six emerged from existing agreements among IOUs to coordinate operations through central dispatch (Boulden, 2016)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
