Structural Constraints in Ukrainian Politics

Abstract

The 2010 Ukrainian presidential election points to a certain consistency in Ukrainian electoral politics, especially in regional dynamics. These enduring constraints limit the options of political leaders and channel outcomes into a narrower range than would be expected from a focus on the personal preferences of leaders or the political views of the forces they represent. This article seeks to identify these constraints and the prospects that the current government or a future one might escape them. Starting with the common assumption that all leaders (even in democracies) seek to retain office as long as possible, the article examines what has made consolidation of power more difficult in Ukraine than other post-Soviet societies. Important factors include regional divisions, the absence of a natural-resource-based economy, and the relative weakness of the post-communist security services. It then considers factors that favor the consolidation of political power and the erosion of meaningful competition, such as weak institutions, weak norms, and increasing facility with the methods used elsewhere in the region to weaken competitors. The article concludes by proposing that both authoritarian consolidation and democratic consolidation present challenges in Ukraine and that we need to focus more on the barriers to the concentration of power in new democracies.