Structural Causes, Social Consequences: Divide-and-Rule in Coercive Diplomacy

Abstract

Do social cleavages invite external threats? This article argues that social schisms could reduce states' ability to deliver effective deterrence and stand firm against coercion. Previous literature has focused on how the domestic audience could signal strong resolutions.This article, in contrast, contends that coercion could make domestic societies vulnerable, especially coercion following the logic of divide-and-rule. Borrowing the wisdom from social psychology and threat attribution, I show that the public could fail when they are unable to reach a consensus because of diverse preferences and enemy perceptions. States suffering from such a problem become easy targets for coercers. In this article, I modify the ultimatum game to approximate a coercer's attempts to exploit the target's domestic society. I further demonstrate that exploiting intergroup relations has limitations because of the information problem. I also provide two brief case studies to show how coercive diplomacy could benefit from a divided society. In a society, every choice modifies existing intergroup relations, including attributing external threats. Therefore, gaps in threat perceptions become possible causes for social cleavages and deterrence failures. In the face of emerging challenges from hybrid warfare and gray zone coercion, democracies could be especially vulnerable to coercers.