Strict dominance and symmetry

Abstract

The strict dominance principle that a wager always paying better than another is rationally preferable is one of the least controversial principles in decision theory. I shall show that (given the Axiom of Choice) there is a contradiction between strict dominance and plausible isomorphism or symmetry conditions, by showing how in several natural cases one can construct isomorphic wagers one of which strictly dominates the other. In particular, I will show that there is a pair of wagers on the outcomes of a uniform spinner which differ simply in where the zero degrees point of the spinner is defined to be but where one wager dominates the other. I shall also argue that someone who accepts Williamson’s famous argument that the probability of an infinite sequence of heads is zero should accept the symmetry conditions, and thus has reason to weaken the strict dominance principle, and I shall propose a restriction of the principle to “implementable” wagers. Our main result also has implications for social choice principles.