Abstract

Local governments and municipalities serve at the forefront of public service delivery. However, the extent of public and social services provided for migrants and refugees varies greatly at the sub-national level. Many local governments and municipalities overstep their administrative boundaries to respond to the needs of refugees, whereas there are also many that either does not acknowledge refugees or may even be hostile towards them. Why do some municipalities cater to the needs of refugees, whereas others do not? The literature provides various explanations for sub-national variation in responses to immigrants; these explanations include but are not limited to partisanship, local electoral competition, rentierism, and bureaucratic initiative. This dissertation explores the subnational variation in municipal responses to refugees by looking at Turkey, the world's largest refugee-hosting country, hosting approximately 3.5 million Syrian refugees of which 98 percent live in non-camp settings, who are scattered across the country. Using data from 95 interviews conducted over the course of a year plus an original survey with 268 local municipal bureaucrats in Turkey, it demonstrates that the decision to introduce municipal social services for refugees at the local level is largely made by mid-level bureaucrats at local municipalities who work closely with a diverse group of stakeholders including the mayor, constituents, local civil society organizations, political parties, and refugees. Informal and personal ties that the mid-level bureaucrats retain with the communities they serve, allow them to navigate multiple interests at once and stretch the limits of their discretion in favor of service provision for out-groups such as refugees. The evidence also shows that municipal accommodation does not always emanate from service providers' altruistic and professional motivations to serve persons in need. Through the social assistance they provide, bureaucrats control, manage, and discipline refugees and render them invisible to the public eye, thus helping to safeguard mayors' electoral interests.--Author's abstract

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.