Strengths and Limitations of Discourse Ethics

Abstract

Karl-Otto Apel's philosophical enterprise is characterized by title of his monumental work in two volumes published in 1973, Towards a Transformation of Philosophy.1 Since 1988, Apel has engaged in second phase of his program, what he calls an ethics of discussion and of responsibility, presented in Discourse and Responsibility.2 Apel's second project of an ethics of discussion parallels that of Jurgen Habermas. For many years they both taught at University of Frankfurt and organized academic events and seminars together. They also heavily borrow from each other in their respective works. is only with their late research on ethics of discussion that differences have become more acute and taken a personal tone, Habermas publicly accusing Apel of being stubborn and Apel complaining that Habermas' resistance to possibility of an absolute foundation is irritating. The major point of contention among vast number of points of agreement concerns possibility of an ultimate foundation of, among other things, moral norms, a possibility Apel defends, whereas Habermas rejects it, speaking instead of quasi-transcendental features of discussion that lead indeed to an ethics of discussion, but that do not warrant an ultimate foundation.3 Habermas prefers to speak of a detranscendentalization of philosophy. I will here essentially focus on Apel's specific project, mentioning Habermas only in order to clarify or contrast some elements of Apel's views. Both Apel and Habermas in their different ways have taken issue with Richard Rorty's brand of pragmatism. Apel likes to tell his audience and students, among whom I had privilege to be, that he had to confront Rorty in a conference in Vienna in 1985. Pressed to respond to a question about foundation of ethics, Rorty answered: It is only a matter of common For I am American. We only have to persuade others of fact that way we chose is right one. Apel, who after high school had volunteered with his entire class in German army and fought in WWII from 1940 to 1945, told us, his students: A bit perpelexed I asked him following question: And I am German. is only a matter of common sense. I meant that at time of Third common sense was called among us the sound popular (das gesunde Volksempfinden). was in invoking this popular instinct that principle of democratic state was put into question. ... I meant that universal of a postconventional morality, called upon to legitimate positive law itself, for example by insisting on something like human rights, these were invalidated quite successfully in name of a consensus about specificity of a We.4 Apel sees such a faith in common sense as something that can lead to a paralysis of ethical principles and he claims that this is what, linked to materialism and opportunism, led to a failure of 'intellectual elite' in Third Reich.5 But how do we move from we, Germans of Third Reich to we, who have a liberal tradition guaranteeing basic democratic and human rights? Apel and Habermas, in part due to their personal experience in their youth of indoctrination, repression, and terror, refuse Rorty's solution of a simply horizontal move from one form of community to another through engagement and conversation. Not only is there no guarantee that we will reach what Rorty characterizes as the widest possible intersubjective agreement.6 There is also no guarantee that this agreement will fall on right side of divide between liberal tradition and repressive tradition. A normative dimension is absent in Rorty's view which, Apel and Habermas contend, is structurally embedded in very process of discussion. Apel wants to show that there is an ideaUzation at very core of statements we make, like in a justification we provide, that exceeds, and this means transcends context of utterance. …