Abstract
This article examines a successful terrorist attack and failed missions in the United States to inform counterterrorism. Six case studies were selected based on groups of terrorists (three or more) who conducted or planned an attack within the United States. The variables measured were the organizational learning cycles of the terrorists, and the financial, community, and security institutions they used. The learning cycles revealed that success was a function of experience and training so learning deficits made detection possible. The failed cells lacked funding which increased their vulnerability when they sought financing. Supportive community institutions and their effective use made plot detection difficult. Terrorists who ineffectively used and leveraged security institutions were more likely to fail. The United States should continue the preemptive use of undercover agents/informants to detect terrorist plots.
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