Abstract
Abstract This chapter outlines and evaluates Strawson’s various responses to the conceptual and epistemological problem of other minds. Questions are raised about his way of motivating the conceptual problem and his solution to the problem. His attempt to dissolve the epistemological problem is shown to be unsuccessful, since it fails to demonstrate that in order to ascribe states of consciousness to oneself, one must have knowledge of other minds. Strawson’s explanation of how we ascribe mental states to others is also shown to be excessively narrow. It is a mistake to explain other-ascriptions in exclusively behavioural terms, without taking proper account of other potential grounds. Empathy is of particular interest in this connection, both as grounding ascriptions of mental states to others and as a potential source of understanding of other minds.
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