Strategy Dynamics with Feedback Control in the Global Climate Dilemma Games

Abstract

Global warming is becoming a knotty problem that cannot be ignored, making many countries face conflicts of interest and the need for cooperation. Evolutionary game theory provides an effective research framework for this kind of cooperation dilemma. From the perspective of control engineering, the mutual influence of environment and system can be utilized to achieve the purpose of self-adaptive adjustment and temperature control. Here, by combining feedback control and evolutionary game theory, we aim to restrict the global temperature to an expected level. Particularly, the controller is motivated by the threshold public goods game, where whether the threshold is realized or not is directly related to the different benefit states of the system. Results are gained where the temperature and cooperation level can be stabilized at the pre-set level. Moreover, we derive the correlation between the temperature trend and parameter settings, which is an efficient guideline to improve the control performance in global warming problems.