Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, by Shawn T. Grimes

Abstract

Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918, by Shawn T. Grimes, Woodbridge, UK, Boydell Press, 2012, xiv, 263 pp. $115.00 US (Cloth). The history of the Royal Navy before and during the First World War has been an area well worn by historical interest. Despite hundreds of monographs and articles, scant consensus has emerged regarding the direction of British naval policy for much of the period. The Navy's war plans, or lack thereof, has been an area in which historians have been especially critical of the Admiralty. This trend was begun by intellectual officers such as Herbert Richmond, who attacked the Admiralty heavily on this score during and after the First World War. Claims that the legacy of Sir John was no plans for war, no knowledge of an enemy's plan or movements and that the Navy had very big body with a very small brain have proven to be enduring. In this book, based upon the author's 2003 doctoral thesis, Shawn Grimes conclusively rebuts these claims. The reader might be excused for wondering how the opinions of such august service luminaries might be effectively addressed. However in by far the most cohesive, well researched and thorough treatment of British naval war planning of the period, the author not only addresses these claims, but also conclusively illustrates them to be baseless. Grimes demonstrates the development of the Admiralty's thinking department, the work done planning for a war against Germany, and the consistency with which the Admiralty acted in accordance with these plans. Through a careful study of the manoeuvres of the period, fleet distributions, and procurement, Grimes is able show long-term trends and progressions in the Admiralty's war planning which are hard to deny. The book's central argument is that the war planning conducted by the Navy before and during the Fisher era followed a discernible path into the First World War. Plans developed for war against a potential Franco-Russian combination before 1905 informed and shaped those developed later against Germany. Grimes subscribes to the recent trend of challenging revisionist interpretations which have claimed that Germany was not viewed as a naval threat before 1905. He cites extensive evidence of naval planning for a war against Germany from 1901-2 onwards. In one of the most important and original elements of this work he also emphasizes the importance of the Baltic in Admiralty planning against Germany between 1905-9. This is combined with a valuable tracing of the development of the Admiralty's commercial blockade against Germany and the demonstration that this strategy was confirmed as the Navy's primary offensive option as early as 1912. …