Strategies of dissimulation in the pseudosciences

Abstract

There are many forms of experience and knowledge: spontaneous perception, artistic emotion, political conviction, religious faith, theology, philosophy, etc. Scientific research represents one such form-the most methodical and rigorous of them. The intuitive practice of science goes back to prehistory. Millenia ago men in activities such as rearing animals, tilling the earth, building towers or caring for the sick realized that certain forms of experience and knowledge were more useful than others, making it possible to discover principles-such as that of the lever-which could be applied successfully again and again in different situations. Early scientists followed the rules of scientific work without having formulated them. Archimedes did not need to study a manual of methodology in order to establish the celebrated principle of hydrostatics which bears his name. In human history it was only very gradually that such people arrived at clear and precise definitions of the rules for scientific verification of suppositions and beliefs. Among the main authors of a rigorous, didactic formulation of these rules we should make special mention of Francis Bacon (1960/1620), Claude Bernard ( 196611865) and Karl Popper (196511935). The latter clearly expressed a particularly important principle for distinguishing truly scientific disciplines from pseudosciences, that is to say disciplines which appear to be sciences but which do not satisfy the essential criteria for scientific status. I will recall Popper’s principle and the main characteristics of the pseudosciences. I will then describe the difficulties which face the proponents of the pseudosciences in their relations with the public and with the scientific community. Finally I will examine how the users of the pseudosciences are able to conceal the fact that they do not meet the essential criteria for sciences.