Strategies and Goals of Russian Diplomacy During the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999)

Konrad Łukasz Pawłowski

doi:10.17951/k.2017.24.1.41

Abstract

The article supports the thesis that despite Cold War style oratory and criticism of the NATO's intervention against Yugoslavia, Russian policy on Kosovo armed conflict represented a realistic and pragmatic approach. It points that Russian leadership was conscious of the domestic political and economic problems as well as the unfavourable post Cold War shift of power and changes of the international system and knew that Russia could not reply to the unilateral NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. It argues that Moscow admittedly wanted to avoid NATO intervention at the Balkans which inevitably undermined the international position of Russia, but despite some political gestures and claims about the traditional Russo-Serbian friendship had no direct geopolitical interests at the Kosovo conflict, did not believe the Milosevic's 'truths' and actively participated at the high-level international peacemaking initiatives together with the West. It claims that Russia actually supported Western efforts aimed to stop the violence at the province and start political dialogue between Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians about the autonomy of the province. It finally argues that Russian constructive approach 'helped' the Alliance to end its war over Kosovo and stresses that peace proposals offered to Belgrade were collectively worked out and endorsed by the West and Russia.

Highlights

It seems eligible to claim that NATO’s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (1999) represented one of the most important moments in present political history, a “welcomed” or “dangerous” precedent that, to a large extent, defined the emerging system of the post-Cold War international relations
During the period of 1998–1999, Russian policy towards the Kosovo issue was generally realistic and pragmatic and Moscow actively participated in many diplomatic efforts aimed at finding a political solution to the Kosovo conflict
He got a guarantee that the West was still interested in the political solution of the Kosovo question and Russia would play an active role in this diplomatic process

Summary

Introduction

It seems eligible to claim that NATO’s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (1999) represented one of the most important moments in present political history, a “welcomed” or “dangerous” precedent that, to a large extent, defined the emerging system of the post-Cold War international relations. Ivanov told Albright that Russia did not accept the use of force against Yugoslavia but agreed that serious military threat could convince Milosevic to participate in the planned conference.2 In exchange, he got a guarantee that the West was still interested in the political solution of the Kosovo question and Russia would play an active role in this diplomatic process.

Results

Conclusion